PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Appellate courts ought not to interfere with findings of fact of trial courts which had the unique opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses give evidence and observing their demeanour in the witness box. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this rule, a major exception being that where such findings are in fact inferences from findings properly made, the Court of Appeal is in as good a position as the trial court to come to a decision. An appellate court will also interfere with findings of fact where such findings are perverse. A decision is said to be perverse: (a) When it runs counter to the evidence; or (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shuts its eyes to the obvious; or (c) When it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Sylvester Umaru Onu, JSC, in State v. Ajie (2000) NLC-711999(SC) at pp. 6–7; Paras B–A.
"Appellate courts ought not to interfere with findings of fact of trial courts which had the unique opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses give evidence and observing their demeanour in the witness box. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this rule, a major exception being that where such findings are in fact inferences from findings properly made, the Court of Appeal is in as good a position as the trial court to come to a decision. An appellate court will also interfere with findings of fact where such findings are perverse. A decision is said to be perverse: (a) When it runs counter to the evidence; or (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shuts its eyes to the obvious; or (c) When it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Appellate courts defer to trial court findings on witness credibility. However, interference is justified where: (1) findings are inferences (appellate court equally positioned); (2) findings are perverse—running counter to evidence, considering extraneous matters, ignoring obvious facts, or causing miscarriage of justice. Perversity is the key exception. Mere disagreement is insufficient. The appellant must demonstrate that no reasonable tribunal could have reached that conclusion on the evidence. This balances deference with corrective justice. The exceptions ensure manifest errors are corrected while preserving trial court advantage in credibility assessment.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE