LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE — Interference with Findings of Fact — When Appellate Court May Interfere
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
An appellate court should not interfere with findings of fact unless the findings are not supported by the pleadings or evidence, or are perverse.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Katsina-Alu, JSC, in Nwadiogbu & Ors v. Nnadozie & Ors (2001) NLC-301997(SC) at p. 11; Para C.
"An appellate court should not interfere with the findings of the trial court unless the findings are not supported by the pleadings and/or evidence are perverse."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Appellate courts defer to trial court findings of fact. Interference is justified only if the findings are unsupported by pleadings or evidence, or are perverse. Perversity means no reasonable tribunal could have reached that conclusion on the evidence. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error. The appellate court will not re-evaluate evidence simply because it might have reached a different conclusion. The principle respects the trial court’s advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses. Interference is reserved for exceptional cases where the findings are manifestly unsupported or unreasonable. The rule promotes finality and judicial efficiency. The appellant must show clear error, not mere disagreement.