APPELLATE PRACTICE — Re-evaluation of Evidence — When appellate court may interfere
Ratio Decidendi
Per Muhammad, JSC, in Hamza v. Kure (2010) NLC-123-227-2001(SC) at p. 12, paras. D–E:
"Our law is replete with decided authorities that where the findings of fact made by a trial judge are not supported by credible evidence, or there is improper evaluation of evidence, the appeal court is in as much good position to deal with the facts and findings as the trial court."
Explanation / Scope
This principle establishes that where findings of fact are not supported by credible evidence or there is improper evaluation of evidence, the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to deal with the facts and findings. The principle applies where findings are challenged. It ensures that appellate courts can correct errors in evaluation. The principle reflects the limits of the trial court’s advantage. It prevents unsupported findings from standing. The court must determine if the findings are supported. The principle provides guidance on appellate re-evaluation of evidence.