PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

When an application is made to set aside an award it is the substance of the ground of the application that is material and not how counsel for the appellant described it. Thus, where the ground of the application is as specified in section 29(2), that counsel for the applicant described it as misconduct will not make the application one brought outside section 29(2).

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ayoola, JSC, in Araka v. Ejeagwu (2000) NLC-511999(SC) at p. 31; Paras A–C.
"When an application is made to set aside an award it is the substance of the ground of the application that is material and not how counsel for the appellant described it. Thus, where the ground of the application is as specified in section 29(2), that counsel for the applicant described it as misconduct will not make the application one brought outside section 29(2)."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Courts look at the substance of the ground for setting aside an award, not the label counsel attaches. Even if counsel misdescribes a ground as “misconduct” (Section 30) when it properly falls under Section 29(2), the court will treat it according to its substance. The classification determines which section applies, but the limitation period remains three months regardless. Parties cannot avoid time bars by mislabeling their application. The court examines the actual complaint—if it challenges the award’s validity on recognized grounds, it is a setting-aside application subject to the three-month limit.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE