LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CIVIL PROCEDURE — Fundamental Rights Enforcement — Effect of Leave to Apply — Leave Does Not Conclusively Determine Justiciability
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
The power to determine the justiciability of a cause of action under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules lies with the trial judge; the grant of leave does not conclusively determine that the action is properly brought under the rules.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Ogundare, JSC, in Sea Trucks Nigeria Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) NLC-1201995(SC) at p. 17; Paras A–B.
"The power to determine the justiciability of a cause of action under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 lies with the trial Judge and that once he has given leave to bring in an application, justiciability can no longer be questioned. I think the proper approach is to examine the reliefs sought by the applicant, the grounds for such reliefs and the facts relied upon."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
The grant of leave to apply for fundamental rights enforcement does not conclusively determine that the action is justiciable under the rules. The court retains the power to examine whether the application is properly brought. Leave is merely a procedural filter; it does not confer jurisdiction where none exists. The trial judge must still examine the reliefs, grounds, and facts to determine if the breach of fundamental right is the main plank. The principle prevents parties from relying on the grant of leave to circumvent the proper procedure. The court will strike out applications that do not genuinely raise fundamental rights issues, even if leave was granted. The substance of the claim determines justiciability.
