Principle Statement

In interpreting statutes or the Constitution, words should be given their ordinary meaning to discover the intention of the lawmaker. Where words are clear and not ambiguous, effect should be given to them. There is no room for applying interpretive principles that presume ambiguity.

Ratio Decidendi (Source)

Per Ogbuagu, JSC, in Ekulo Farms Ltd & Anor v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2006) NLC-123-306-2001(SC) at pp. 28–29; Paras E–B.

"It is now firmly settled in a line of decided authorities in several different languages or pronouncements, that in the interpretation of Statutes and/or Constitution, words therein, should be given their ordinary meaning... or that ordinary meaning of words therein used is to be adopted in order to discover the intention of the law maker... or that where words of a statute are clear and not ambiguous, effect should be given to them and that there is the need to avoid an absurdity... or that ordinary or literal meaning is to be given to them and enforced accordingly... or that no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense of the words themselves in a case best declare the intention of the legislature or that there is need to construe words used in their natural and ordinary sense... or that there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptuous in cases of ambiguity in the statute. That they ought to receive the construction according to their plain meaning."

Explanation / Scope

Clear constitutional words must be given their ordinary literal meaning. Interpretive principles apply only where ambiguity exists. The principle applies to constitutional interpretation.

Cases Applying This Principle