PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

In cases involving allegations of bias or real likelihood of bias, there must be cogent and reasonable evidence to satisfy the court that there was in fact such bias or real likelihood of bias as alleged. ... the mere vague suspicion of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people should not be made a standard to constitute proof of such serious complaints.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Iguh, JSC, in Ojengbede v. Esan & Anor (2001) NLC-321991(SC) at p. 8; Paras A–C.
"In cases involving allegations of bias or real likelihood of bias, there must be cogent and reasonable evidence to satisfy the court that there was in fact such bias or real likelihood of bias as alleged. ... the mere vague suspicion of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people should not be made a standard to constitute proof of such serious complaints."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Allegations of bias require cogent and reasonable evidence—mere vague suspicion or whimsical speculation is insufficient. The standard is objective: would a reasonable person, fully apprised of the facts, conclude bias likely? Capricious and unreasonable suspicions cannot constitute proof. The burden is on the party alleging bias to adduce credible evidence. The court will not infer bias from trivial or unsubstantiated claims. The principle protects judges from frivolous recusal applications. Allegations of bias are serious and must be proved. The test is real likelihood, not possibility. The complainant must demonstrate facts from which bias can reasonably be inferred. The court will not rely on hypersensitive or irrational perceptions.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE