PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

A judge cannot engage in translation or interpretation of documents as he cannot perform the role of a witness and a judge simultaneously. When a judge rejects a translation and privately translates the document himself without the knowledge of the accused, relying on it to convict, this constitutes a breach of fair hearing.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Uwais, JSC, in Damina v. The State (1995) NLC-1191994(SC) at pp. 30–33; Paras. D–B.
"A judge cannot engage in the translation or interpretation of documents since he cannot perform the role of a witness and a judge at the same time. When a learned trial Judge rejected the translation in Exhibit 2A and took upon himself to translate it in his chambers while writing his judgment, he contravened the mandatory provisions of Section 242 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Any reasonable or knowledgeable observer of the trial would not feel that the learned trial Judge was fair to the appellant when he rejected the translation in Exhibit 2A and took upon himself to translate Exhibit 2 into English in private without the knowledge of the appellant until the learned trial Judge came to deliver his judgment, and in doing so relied upon that translation made by him to convict the appellant. This constitutes a breach of the appellant's right to fair hearing under Section 33(4) of the 1979 Constitution."
View Judgment

EXPLANATION / SCOPE

A judge cannot act as interpreter and judge simultaneously. Private translation without the accused’s knowledge violates fair hearing. The principle applies to all trials. The interpreter must be sworn and subject to cross-examination. The judge’s private knowledge cannot replace evidence. The rule protects the accused’s right to challenge translation. The decision is void for breach of fair hearing. The court will set aside the conviction.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE