PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Where the parties are not the same and the facts are at large, determining where the balance of probability tilts is dependent on a new set of evidence and no reasonable embarrassment is occasioned so as to make a Judge to be biased in favour of his previous finding. Probability of a fact must be seen as matter of preference between two sets of conflicting evidence given in a particular case.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ayoola, JSC, in Kenon & Ors v. Tekam & Ors (2001) NLC-611995(SC) at pp. 22–23; Paras D–A.
"Where the parties are not the same and the facts are at large, determining where the balance of probability tilts is dependent on a new set of evidence and no reasonable embarrassment is occasioned so as to make a Judge to be biased in favour of his previous finding. Probability of a fact must be seen as matter of preference between two sets of conflicting evidence given in a particular case."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

A judge’s previous decision on a similar issue in a case between different parties does not create bias. The new case has different parties and different evidence. The balance of probability depends on the new evidentiary record. No reasonable embarrassment arises. Probability is a matter of preference between conflicting evidence in each specific case. The judge is presumed capable of evaluating each case on its own merits. The principle prevents the “once biased, always biased” fallacy. The judge may have a view on the law, but that is not disqualifying. The test is whether a reasonable observer would perceive bias. Different parties and different facts normally defeat any inference of bias. The judge’s prior reasoning may be considered but does not pre-determine the outcome.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE