PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

The procedure is totally covered by the provisions of section 32(1)(c) of the 1979 Constitution because what was done at that stage was that the court ordered that the respondent be remanded in custody upon an allegation by the police that he (respondent) was on reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, to wit: conspiracy to commit treasonable offence and actually committing treasonable offence.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Akintan, JSC, in Lufadeju & Anor v. Johnson (2007) NLC-123-247-2001(SC) at p. 24; Paras D–E.
"The procedure is totally covered by the provisions of section 32(1)(c) of the 1979 Constitution because what was done at that stage was that the court ordered that the respondent be remanded in custody upon an allegation by the police that he (respondent) was on reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, to wit: conspiracy to commit treasonable offence and actually committing treasonable offence."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

This principle establishes that remand proceedings are covered by Section 32(1)(c) of the 1979 Constitution (now Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution). The provision allows deprivation of liberty upon reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. The magistrate’s remand order is a lawful procedure permitted by law. The principle ensures that remand proceedings are constitutional and do not violate the right to liberty. It applies where a suspect is brought before a magistrate for remand. The court must act upon reasonable suspicion. The principle protects the integrity of remand proceedings.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE