LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Fundamental Rights — Section 33(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution Distinguished from Arraignment Requirements
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
Section 33(6)(a) concerns the entitlement to be informed promptly in a language understood of the nature of the offence charged and has nothing to do with arraignment or plea, which is covered by section 215 CPA. Police charging a suspect differs from arraignment before a trial court.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Iguh, JSC, in Amala v. State (2004) NLC-2312002(SC) at pp. 28–29; Paras E–A.
"Section 33(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution essentially concerns the entitlement of a person to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the criminal offence with which he is being charged and has nothing to do with the arraignment or plea of an accused person before a trial court which is fully covered by section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The police at the conclusion of their investigation of a criminal offence arrest the suspect where a prima facie case is established against him, charge him with the disclosed offence or offences and caution him in the usual way whereupon the suspect may, if he so desires, volunteer a written statement in answer to the charge preferred against him. The stage at which a suspect is formally 'charged' with a criminal offence by the police after he has been arrested at the conclusion of the investigation of the offence leveled against him must be distinguished from the stage at which he is 'arraigned' and his plea taken before the trial court."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Section 33(6)(a) applies to police charging, not court arraignment. Arraignment is governed by section 215 CPA. The principle applies to constitutional and criminal procedure. The rule distinguishes police charge from court arraignment. The right to be informed promptly relates to pre-trial stage. Arraignment involves formal reading of charge and plea taking in court.
