LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Interpretation of Constitution — Section 66(1)(h) of the 1999 Constitution — Strict Construction of Provisions Imposing Disability on Citizens
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
A statute that imposes a penalty on a citizen ought to be interpreted strictly. Section 66(1) of the 1999 Constitution denies citizens the right to contest elections if they have done certain things, imposing a disability. It is therefore penal in nature and must be interpreted strictly. The provision cannot be stretched to include a court judgment, as a court judgment does not derive its validity from acceptance by the government.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Oguntade, JCA (as he then was), quoted with approval by Edozie, JSC, in Okotie-Eboh v. Manager & Ors (2004) NLC-1972003(SC) at pp. 22–23; Paras E–A.
"Now, it is settled law that a statute which imposes a penalty on a citizen ought to be interpreted strictly: See Okure v. Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1974) 4 S.C. 93. There is no doubt that the purpose of section 66(1) of 1999 Constitution is to deny to some citizens the right to contest to be member of the National Assembly if they had at one time or the other done certain things. The provision imposes a disability. It is therefore penal in nature. Interpreting section 66(1)(h) strictly as I should, I ask myself the question whether the judgment of an election tribunal given in 1991 is by the force of section 66(1)(h) of the 1999 Constitution able to disable a citizen from being elected a member of the National Assembly. I think not. The provision cannot be stretched to include a court judgment. This is because the judgment of a court does not derive its validity from an acceptance by the Federal or State Government as section 66(1)(h) conveys. The judgment of the election tribunal given in 1991 in W/ET/1/90 does not in my view fall within the category of tribunals under section 66(1)(h) of the 1999 Constitution."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Provisions imposing disabilities must be strictly construed. The principle applies to constitutional interpretation. Section 66(1)(h) is penal in nature. The rule prevents expansive interpretation that would disqualify citizens unjustly. Court judgments are not covered. The principle is well-established.
