PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Section 256(2) of the 1979 Constitution does not bar a judicial officer who has ceased to hold office from appearing before a court or tribunal to conduct in person a case in which they are a party; a retired judge appearing in person as a litigant is not appearing or acting as a legal practitioner within the subsection's meaning.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Bello, CJN, in Atake v. Afejuku (1994) NLC-2181992(SC) at pp. 9–10; Paras A–D.
"Section 256(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 does not bar a judicial officer who has ceased to hold office from appearing before a court or tribunal to conduct in person a case in which he is a party. A retired judge appearing in person as a litigant is not appearing or acting as a legal practitioner within the meaning of the subsection."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Section 256(2) bars judicial officers from practicing law while in office and for a period after leaving office. However, this doesn’t prohibit retired judges from conducting their own cases in person as litigants. The distinction: practicing as a legal practitioner (representing others for fee) versus appearing as a self-represented litigant (conducting one’s own case). Everyone has the constitutional right to conduct their own litigation. When retired judges appear in person for themselves, they act as litigants exercising self-representation rights, not as legal practitioners. The prohibition targets post-retirement legal practice (to prevent conflicts of interest and maintain judicial dignity), not litigants’ self-representation rights. This interpretation balances: preventing improper judicial-legal practice connections against protecting fundamental litigation rights.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE