LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Ouster Clauses – Retrospectivity Not Presumed
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
The provision of section 11 of the Decree applies only to suits or actions brought on or after the date of commencement of the Decree because it does not have a retrospective effect; retrospectivity is not presumed.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
"The conclusion to which I have come is that the provision of section 11 of the Decree applies only to suits or actions brought on or after the 20th June, 1991, which was the date of commencement of the Decree, because it does not have a retrospective effect."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Ouster clauses (and legislation generally) are presumed to operate prospectively, not retrospectively, unless express language indicates otherwise. This principle means: (1) Legislation applies to events occurring after its commencement date; (2) Pre-commencement events and proceedings are governed by pre-existing law; (3) Retrospective application requires clear legislative intent through express words or necessary implication. Here, section 11’s ouster provision applied only to suits brought on or after June 20, 1991 (commencement date), not to earlier-filed suits. This presumption against retrospectivity serves: protecting vested rights, preventing unfair surprise (parties relied on law as it stood), maintaining legal certainty, and respecting acquired rights. Courts require explicit language for retrospective effect: “this provision applies to proceedings commenced before this Act” or similar clear words. Absent such language, legislation affects only post-commencement matters. This is particularly important for ouster clauses that could unfairly eliminate jurisdiction over pending cases if applied retrospectively. The principle protects litigants’ expectations and procedural rights based on law existing when they initiated proceedings