LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CRIMINAL LAW – Common Intention – Distinction Between Common Intention and Common Object
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
In the context of section 8 of the Criminal Code, the common intention of accused persons must be distinguished from their common object. Where the crime committed is unrelated to the common intention of the accused persons, such a case cannot come under section 8 of the Criminal Code. The killing of the deceased must be a probable consequence of the prosecution of the unlawful purpose to which all the accused persons were party.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Iguh, JSC, in Alarape & Ors v. State (2001) NLC-872000(SC) at p. 27; Paras A–D.
"In the context of section 8 of the Criminal Code, the common intention of accused persons must be distinguished from their common object. Where the crime committed is unrelated to the common intention of the accused persons, such a case cannot come under section 8 of the Criminal Code. The killing of the deceased must be a probable consequence of the prosecution of the unlawful purpose to which all the accused persons were party."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Common intention (shared purpose to prosecute an unlawful act) differs from common object (the specific crime intended). Under Section 8, liability attaches only where the offence committed was a probable consequence of prosecuting the unlawful purpose to which all were party. If the crime is unrelated to the common intention, Section 8 does not apply. The killing must have been foreseeable—not merely possible but probable—given the joint unlawful enterprise. This prevents holding participants liable for unexpected or collateral offences. The distinction ensures that only consequences flowing naturally from the common purpose attract joint liability. The prosecution must prove the nexus between the common intention and the crime committed.