LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CRIMINAL LAW – Common Intention – Inference from Circumstances – Whether Express Agreement Required
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
Common intention in criminal law may be inferred from circumstances described in the evidence led before the court and need not be provable only by the agreement of the accused persons. The test of liability under section 8 of the Criminal Code is not whether the other accused persons counselled or procured the principal offender to use the lethal weapon that caused the death of the deceased but whether it was a probable consequence of the prosecution of their joint unlawful act or intention.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Iguh, JSC, in Alarape & Ors v. State (2001) NLC-872000(SC) at p. 24; Paras A–D.
"Common intention in criminal law may be inferred from circumstances described in the evidence led before the court and need not be provable only by the agreement of the accused persons. The test of liability under section 8 of the Criminal Code is not whether the other accused persons counselled or procured the principal offender to use the lethal weapon that caused the death of the deceased but whether it was a probable consequence of the prosecution of their joint unlawful act or intention."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Common intention need not be proved by express agreement—it may be inferred from circumstances and conduct. The test under Section 8 is not whether co-accused counselled or procured the specific act (e.g., using a lethal weapon), but whether the offence committed was a probable consequence of prosecuting their joint unlawful purpose. If the group sets out to commit an unlawful act and one member uses a weapon, all may be liable if such use was foreseeable. The law imputes constructive liability. This prevents accused persons from escaping liability by claiming they did not specifically agree to the fatal act. The focus is on the common purpose, not the precise means.