PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

If counts for conspiracy and for substantive offences alleged to have been committed in carrying out that conspiracy are tried together, there is no general principle that whenever a verdict is returned of not guilty on conspiracy charges but guilty on substantive offences (or vice versa), that the verdict is necessarily inconsistent; each case must depend on its particular circumstances.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ogwuegbu, JSC, in Erim v. The State (1994) NLC-1601993(SC) at p. 15; Para A.
"If counts for conspiracy and for substantive offences alleged to have been committed in the carrying out of that conspiracy are tried together, there is no general principle that, whenever a verdict is returned of not guilty on a count charging conspiracy to commit offences and if guilty on other counts in the same information charging those specific offences or vice versa, that the verdict is necessarily inconsistent. Each case must depend on its particular circumstances."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Apparently inconsistent verdicts on conspiracy and substantive offenses aren’t automatically improper. Legitimate reasons may exist: (1) Acquittal on conspiracy but conviction on substantive offense—evidence shows the accused committed the substantive crime but didn’t prove they agreed with others beforehand (they may have acted alone or joined after agreement); (2) Conviction on conspiracy but acquittal on substantive offense—evidence proves agreement but not that the substantive crime was actually committed or that this accused committed it. Each case is assessed individually. The verdicts are inconsistent only if they’re logically incompatible on the evidence. Courts examine: the evidence supporting each count, whether different evidence supports each verdict, and whether the verdicts can rationally coexist. This flexibility recognizes that conspiracy and substantive offenses have different elements and evidentiary requirements, though overlapping.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE