PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Where an act is capable of two or more interpretations, the interpretation most favorable to the accused should be preferred.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Olatawura, JSC, in Oladele v. The State (1993) NLC-731991(SC) at p. 13; Paras D–E.
"The position in law is that where an act is capable of two or more interpretations the interpretation most favourable to the accused should be preferred."
View Judgment

EXPLANATION / SCOPE

This principle reflects the presumption of innocence and benefit of doubt doctrine. Where evidence is ambiguous—capable of supporting either guilt or innocence—courts must adopt the interpretation favoring the accused. This applies to: conduct that could be innocent or criminal, statements susceptible to multiple meanings, or circumstances consistent with either guilt or innocence. The principle doesn’t require acceptance of implausible interpretations but recognizes that genuine ambiguity should not support conviction. It implements the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard: if evidence equally supports competing interpretations, reasonable doubt exists requiring acquittal. This protective principle ensures criminal liability rests on clear evidence, not speculation, and that doubts arising from ambiguous evidence benefit the accused rather than the prosecution.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE