PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Where the acts of appellants were not of a nature likely to endanger life nor did it appear there was intent to kill or do grievous harm to the deceased, their acts cannot be brought within the ambit of section 316 of the Criminal Code (murder); it is nevertheless an unlawful killing and by virtue of section 317, unlawful killing in circumstances which do not constitute murder is manslaughter.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Iguh, JSC, in Akpabio v. The State (1994) NLC-961993(SC) at pp. 49; Paras A--C.
"On the whole, I have come to the conclusion that the acts of the appellants, on the perculiar circumstances of this case, were not of a nature likely to endanger life nor did it appear there was an intent to kill or do grievous harm to the deceased, and, therefore, the appellants' acts cannot be brought within the ambit of section 316 of the Criminal Code. It was nevertheless an unlawful killing and by virtue of section 317 of the Criminal Code, unlawful killing in circumstances which do not constitute murder is manslaughter."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Murder (section 316) requires: (1) Intent to kill; or (2) Intent to cause grievous harm; or (3) Acts of a nature likely to endanger life. If none of these elements is present, the killing cannot be murder. However, if the killing was unlawful (not justified or excused), it constitutes manslaughter (section 317) by default. Manslaughter is the residual category—unlawful killing without murder’s mens rea. This case illustrates: assault causing death without intent to kill or cause grievous harm, where the assault wasn’t likely to endanger life. This is manslaughter, not murder. The distinction affects: sentencing (murder carries death penalty, manslaughter carries lesser punishment), and moral culpability. Courts carefully assess whether the requisite intent or dangerous nature existed to determine the appropriate conviction

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE