LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CRIMINAL LAW – Rape – Warning on Corroboration – Effect of Misdirection on What Constitutes Corroboration
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
In the present case, there can be no doubt that the learned trial Judge duly warned himself of the danger of convicting the appellant on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. But he erroneously relied on two pieces of evidence already set out as being corroborative of the evidence of the prosecutrix. I think there lies the flaw on the judgment of the learned trial Judge which, with respect, was erroneously affirmed by the Court of Appeal. ... Without doubt, if the learned trial Judge after warning himself, frankly held that there was no corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix and that in the absence of such corroboration, it would be unsafe to convict but that he was nevertheless satisfied with the truth of her evidence and convicted the appellant, it may well have been that the conviction would have been unassailable. But his mind was left with the belief that he found certain matters to be corroboration, whereas they were not. In such circumstance, there may be no other option open to this court than to allow the appeal. See R v. Parker (1925) 18 Cr. App. Rep. 103. This is because although the necessary warning relating to corroboration was clearly given by the learned trial Judge himself by enumerating matters as corroboration which were in fact not so. In such a situation, it cannot be possible for this court to say with any degree of certainty that, with a proper direction, the court must still have come to the same conclusion as it did. See R. v. Philips (supra).
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Iguh, JSC, in Iko v. State (2001) NLC-1772001(SC) at pp. 23–26; Paras A–B.
"In the present case, there can be no doubt that the learned trial Judge duly warned himself of the danger of convicting the appellant on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. But he erroneously relied on two pieces of evidence already set out as being corroborative of the evidence of the prosecutrix. I think there lies the flaw on the judgment of the learned trial Judge which, with respect, was erroneously affirmed by the Court of Appeal. ... Without doubt, if the learned trial Judge after warning himself, frankly held that there was no corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix and that in the absence of such corroboration, it would be unsafe to convict but that he was nevertheless satisfied with the truth of her evidence and convicted the appellant, it may well have been that the conviction would have been unassailable. But his mind was left with the belief that he found certain matters to be corroboration, whereas they were not. In such circumstance, there may be no other option open to this court than to allow the appeal. See R v. Parker (1925) 18 Cr. App. Rep. 103. This is because although the necessary warning relating to corroboration was clearly given by the learned trial Judge himself by enumerating matters as corroboration which were in fact not so. In such a situation, it cannot be possible for this court to say with any degree of certainty that, with a proper direction, the court must still have come to the same conclusion as it did. See R. v. Philips (supra)."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
If the trial judge warns himself but erroneously treats non-corroborative evidence as corroboration, the conviction may be set aside. The error affects the judge’s reasoning. The appellate court cannot be certain that the judge would have convicted if properly directed that there was no corroboration. The flaw is not cured by the fact that the judge gave the warning. The judge must correctly identify what constitutes corroboration. Erroneous belief in corroboration undermines the decision. The appellate court will allow the appeal. The principle ensures that convictions are based on proper legal standards. The prosecution may seek a retrial if the evidence otherwise supports it. The case must be remitted for proper evaluation.
