Principle Statement

An appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with the exercise of a trial court's discretion in granting or refusing bail, especially where there are concurrent findings by two lower courts on the facts. Such interference is only justified in exceptional circumstances, such as where the decision is perverse or founded on an error in law or procedure.

Ratio Decidendi (Source)

Per Muhammad, JSC, in Dokubo-Asari v. FRN (2007) NLC-123-208-2006(SC) at pp. 15–16; Paras A–C.

"The practice of the appeal courts generally, and this has been on for quite sometime, is that where there is a concurrent finding of two lower courts, the appeal court hardly interferes with it except on exceptional circumstances. … This principle of concurrent findings/decisions of two lower courts not to be ordinarily disturbed by a higher court is respected by the courts because it is founded on the understanding that the facts that have been deliberated on by two courts carefully before they arrived at certain conclusions can be supported from the evidence laid before them particularly if much of the findings or conclusions depended on the trial court having heard and seen vital witnesses testify. In this regard it is an exclusive preserve of the trial court and an appellate court certainly lacks power to interfere."

Explanation / Scope

The principles of judicial discretion and concurrent findings are closely linked. Bail decisions are discretionary, and the trial court, having heard the parties and considered the facts, is in the best position to exercise that discretion. Appellate courts show restraint because they do not have the same advantage. This policy promotes finality and respects the trial court’s primary role. The principle applies to all interlocutory and final decisions, not just bail. To succeed on appeal, the applicant must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or a serious misdirection.

Cases Applying This Principle