LEGAL PRINCIPLE: ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS — Order of Court — Effect of Disobedience
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
The restriction of enforcement under Section 71 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Law to mandatory orders only is no longer the law; all orders can be enforced by committal for disobedience.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Wali, JSC, in Hart v. Hart (1990) NLC-521983(SC) at p. 17; Paras A–C.
"The principle enunciated in Doherty v. Doherty [1964] L.L.R. 226 as regards the interpretation of Section 71 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Law restricting its application to the enforcement of mandatory orders only is no longer the law. See the lead Reasons for Judgment of this Court in Osayande Uhunmwagho v F.I. Okojie & Anor. (1989) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt.122) 471 by Nnamani, J.S.C, in which he reviewed the said principle and concluded that he did not endorse the restriction to mandatory orders which Doherty and Adebutu decided."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
The earlier restrictive interpretation of Section 71 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Law (limiting enforcement to mandatory orders) has been overruled. All orders of court, including prohibitory injunctions, can be enforced by committal proceedings for disobedience. The principle reflects the modern approach to enforcement. The court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce its orders. The distinction between mandatory and prohibitory orders is no longer relevant for enforcement purposes. The contemnor cannot escape liability by arguing the order was not mandatory. The principle ensures that all court orders are equally enforceable. The court will not allow technical distinctions to undermine compliance.