PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

It is also settled that a party who intends to prove charges of fraud or charges of criminal malversation or felony must do so beyond reasonable doubt. And that before he can be allowed to prove them, he must have set them down specifically in his pleading (see section 37 (1) of the Evidence Act *Ikoku v. Oli (1962) 1 All NLR 194).

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Kutigi, JSC, in Akpunonu v. Beakart Overseas & Ors (2000) NLC-601995(SC) at pp. 5–6; Paras D–A.
"It is also settled that a party who intends to prove charges of fraud or charges of criminal malversation or felony must do so beyond reasonable doubt. And that before he can be allowed to prove them, he must have set them down specifically in his pleading (see section 37 (1) of the Evidence Act *Ikoku v. Oli (1962) 1 All NLR 194)."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Allegations of fraud, criminal malversation, or felony must be proved beyond reasonable doubt—the criminal standard—not merely on a balance of probabilities. Additionally, such allegations must be specifically pleaded with particulars; general or vague averments are insufficient. Section 37(1) of the Evidence Act requires particularity in pleading fraud. This dual requirement—specific pleading and proof beyond reasonable doubt—reflects the serious nature of fraud allegations and protects parties from unsubstantiated claims that could damage reputation without proper evidentiary foundation.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE