PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Where the accused proffers a reason that some evidence should not be admitted due to an irregularity known to him, the burden shifts to him to prove those facts, as whoever asserts must prove.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Belgore, JSC, in Emeka v. State (2001) NLC-72000(SC) at pp. 4–5; Paras D–A.
"The duty of the prosecution in criminal cases is to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But in cases where the accused proffers a reason where some evidence pertinent to the prosecution's case should not be admitted due to some irregularity known to him, then that is within the knowledge of the accused and it is then the burden shifts to him to prove those facts. This is because whoever asserts must prove. Section 135(1), section 139 Evidence Act and S.141(1) Evidence Act."
View Judgment

EXPLANATION / SCOPE

While the prosecution bears the legal burden of proving voluntariness beyond reasonable doubt, the evidential burden may shift to the accused if they allege specific facts of irregularity within their knowledge. The accused must adduce evidence supporting their allegation (e.g., threats, inducements). The principle is based on the Evidence Act provisions that whoever asserts must prove. The evidential burden is not the same as the legal burden. The accused need only raise a reasonable doubt. The prosecution retains the ultimate legal burden. The rule prevents accused persons from making bare allegations without supporting evidence. The court will consider the accused’s testimony and any other evidence in determining voluntariness.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE

None recorded.