PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

It is well accepted in our jurisprudence that where a person by words or conduct made to another a clear and unequivocal representation of a fact or facts either with knowledge of its falsehood, with intention that it should be acted upon, or has so conducted himself that another would as a reasonable man in his full faculties, understand that a certain representation of fact was intended to be acted upon, and that other person in fact acted upon that representation whereby his position was thereby altered, to his detriment, an estoppel arises against, the person who made the representation and he will not be allowed to aver the contrary of what he presented it to be. Respondent cannot in the instant case who had proceeded as if he had no rights against the Appellant in respect of the dishonour of the cheques, is estopped from relying any such rights.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in Bank of the North Ltd. v. Alhaji Bala Yau (2001) NLC-2501993(SC) at p. 27; Paras A–C.
"It is well accepted in our jurisprudence that where a person by words or conduct made to another a clear and unequivocal representation of a fact or facts either with knowledge of its falsehood, with intention that it should be acted upon, or has so conducted himself that another would as a reasonable man in his full faculties, understand that a certain representation of fact was intended to be acted upon, and that other person in fact acted upon that representation whereby his position was thereby altered, to his detriment, an estoppel arises against, the person who made the representation and he will not be allowed to aver the contrary of what he presented it to be. Respondent cannot in the instant case who had proceeded as if he had no rights against the Appellant in respect of the dishonour of the cheques, is estopped from relying any such rights."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Estoppel by representation arises from clear, unequivocal words or conduct. The representor must intend the representation to be acted upon, or conduct themselves so that a reasonable person would understand it was intended to be acted upon. The representee must act on it to their detriment. The representor is then estopped from asserting the contrary. In this case, the respondent acted as if he had no rights regarding notice of dishonour—proposing repayment, acknowledging liability. He is estopped from later relying on those rights. The representation need not be express; conduct suffices. The representation must be clear and unequivocal. The representee’s reliance must be reasonable. The estoppel prevents injustice from contradictory positions.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE