Ratio Decidendi

Per Musdapher, JSC, in Gbadamosi v. Dairo & Anor (2007) NLC-123-167-2001(SC) at p. 11; Paras D–E, A:

"It is the primary responsibility of the trial court which saw and heard witnesses to evaluate the evidence and pronounce on their credibility or probative value and not the appellate court which neither heard the witnesses nor saw them to observe their demeanours in the witness box. It follows therefore that when a trial court unquestionably evaluates the evidence and appraises the facts of a case, it is not the business of the appellate court to substitute its own views for the views of the trial court."

Explanation / Scope

This principle underscores the unique advantage of the trial judge in assessing witness credibility through demeanour, composure, and consistency under cross-examination. Appellate courts operate on the cold record and are ill-equipped to make such assessments. Therefore, they accord great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact. Interference is only permitted where the trial court’s evaluation is perverse, based on a wrong principle, or where it fails to properly evaluate critical evidence. The principle applies to both civil and criminal proceedings and is a cornerstone of the adversarial system.

Cases Applying This Principle