PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

At the trial, [the appellant] did not contest that PW1 knew him very well and could identify him any time of the day. The question of identification is an issue of fact for the trial court to make a finding on. The learned trial Judge who saw and heard PW1 give evidence, did not hesitate to accept her evidence. I have no reason to interfere with his finding (which finding the court below affirmed) that it was the appellant who invaded the deceased's house on the fateful night, shot and killed him.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ogundare, JSC, in Olalekan v. State (2001) NLC-2041999(SC) at p. 6; Paras A–B.
"At the trial, [the appellant] did not contest that PW1 knew him very well and could identify him any time of the day. The question of identification is an issue of fact for the trial court to make a finding on. The learned trial Judge who saw and heard PW1 give evidence, did not hesitate to accept her evidence. I have no reason to interfere with his finding (which finding the court below affirmed) that it was the appellant who invaded the deceased's house on the fateful night, shot and killed him."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Identification is a factual finding for the trial court, which has the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses. Appellate courts will not interfere with such findings where the witness knew the accused well and the trial court accepted the evidence. Where the accused does not contest prior acquaintance, the identification is even stronger. Concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts on identification are binding unless manifestly wrong. The appellate court assesses whether the trial court properly directed itself on identification principles. Mere possibility of error is insufficient for interference. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating perversity or miscarriage of justice.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE