PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

The burden of proving illiteracy rests on the party who asserts it; where a person signs a document, the presumption is that they are literate and understood its contents, rebuttable only by credible evidence, not merely by the party's assertion.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Wali, JSC, in Anaeze v. Anyaso (1993) NLC-261991(SC) at pp. 14–15; Paras A–C.
"The burden of proving illiteracy rests on the party who asserts it. Where a person signs a document, the presumption is that he is literate and understood its contents. This presumption can only be rebutted by credible evidence, not merely by the party's ipse dixit."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Signing a document (as opposed to thumbprinting) creates a presumption of literacy—literate persons sign, illiterates thumbprint. This presumption places the burden on anyone claiming illiteracy to prove it through credible evidence: testimony from those familiar with the person’s education, evidence of inability to read/write, or expert evidence. “Ipse dixit” (bare assertion) is insufficient—the claimant cannot simply state “I am illiterate” without supporting evidence. This presumption protects transaction security and prevents parties from repudiating documents by falsely claiming illiteracy. However, it’s rebuttable—genuine illiterates can prove their status. The principle balances protecting illiterates under the Illiterates Protection Law against preventing fraudulent claims of illiteracy to avoid contractual obligations

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE