PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Where a witness is shown to have made a previous statement, though unsworn, in distinct conflict with their evidence on oath at trial, the jury should not merely be directed that their trial evidence should be disregarded as unreliable, but also that the previous statement, whether sworn or unsworn, does not constitute evidence upon which they can act; in a non-jury case, the court should direct itself accordingly.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Iguh, JSC, in Akpabio v. The State (1994) NLC-961993(SC) at pp. 35; Paras A--C.
"The law is long settled that where a witness is shown to have made a previous statement, though unsworn, in distinct conflict with his evidence on oath at the trial, the jury should not merely be directed that his evidence at the trial should be disregarded as unreliable, but also that the previous statement, whether sworn or unsworn, do not constitute evidence upon which they can act; and, in a non-jury case, the court should direct itself accordingly."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Previous inconsistent statements create a double exclusion: (1) The trial testimony becomes unreliable due to the inconsistency and should be disregarded; (2) The previous inconsistent statement itself is not evidence—it cannot be used affirmatively to prove the facts stated. The previous statement’s only use is to impeach credibility. Thus, if a witness testifies “X happened” but previously stated “Y happened,” the court must: disregard “X” (as unreliable), not rely on “Y” (as it’s not evidence), and decide the case without this witness’s testimony on that point. This protects against: using unreliable testimony, treating prior statements as substantive evidence, and convicting based on inadmissible hearsay. The principle applies equally to sworn and unsworn prior statements. Courts must explicitly recognize both exclusions when dealing with inconsistent statements.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE