PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

When the issue of traditional history is properly pleaded, the evidence in support of it will have to be considered, in the first instance, just like any evidence adduced in proof of any other issue pleaded in a civil case; in the exercise of assessing such evidence, the court will not consider it improbable simply because there are some minor inconsistencies in it vis-a-vis the facts pleaded; it is any evidence so materially at variance with the pleading in the sense that they both cannot be reconciled (or which has notable internal conflicts) that the court will justifiably reject.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Uwaifo, JSC, in Makinde & Ors v. Akinwale & Ors (2000) NLC-2231994(SC) at p. 14; Paras. D–E.
"When the issue of traditional history is properly pleaded, the evidence in support of it will have to be considered, in the first instance, just like any evidence adduced in proof of any other issue pleaded in a civil case. In the exercise of assessing such evidence, the court will not consider it improbable simply because there are some minor inconsistencies in it vis-a-vis the facts pleaded. It is any evidence so materially at variance with the pleading in the sense that they both cannot be reconciled (or which has notable internal conflicts) that the court will justifiably reject."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

This reinforces Principle 592 regarding traditional evidence assessment. Traditional history evidence is assessed: like any other civil evidence—no special skepticism, same standards apply, and properly pleaded traditional history deserves fair consideration. Minor inconsistencies: Don’t render evidence improbable—courts should not reject for: small discrepancies between evidence and pleading, understandable variations in oral tradition, or immaterial differences. These are expected and acceptable. Material variance: Evidence so different from pleading that: they cannot be reconciled, fundamental contradictions exist, or notable internal conflicts appear—then court justifiably rejects. This serves: realistic traditional evidence assessment, not imposing impossible precision standards, while rejecting fundamentally inconsistent evidence. “Minor inconsistencies…not improbable” means: small variations don’t defeat credibility, courts expect some imprecision in oral tradition, and substance matters more than perfect consistency. “Materially at variance” means: fundamental contradictions, irreconcilable differences, or evidence proving different case than pleaded. “Notable internal conflicts” means: witness contradicts themselves, evidence inconsistent within itself, or major discrepancies appearing. Courts must: distinguish minor from material inconsistencies, accept reasonable variations in traditional evidence, while rejecting fundamentally conflicting testimony. This balanced approach: accommodates oral tradition’s nature, doesn’t demand impossible precision, but maintains evidentiary standards requiring substantial consistency and reliability. The principle prevents both: excessive skepticism toward traditional evidence and uncritical acceptance of contradictory accounts.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE