PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

These judgments constitute acts in recent times from which a court could decide which version of the traditional history was probable; though they do not constitute res judicata, they are however relevant to the issues arising in this case and were rightly used by the learned trial judge to resolve the conflict in the traditional evidence of the parties.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ogundare, JSC, in Akibu v. Oduntan (2000) NLC-431993(SC) at pp. 34–35; Paras. A–B.
"These judgments constitute acts in recent times from which a court could decide which version of the traditional history was probable... Exhibits P7 -- P9, though do not constitute res judicata, are however relevant to the issues arising in this case and were rightly used by the learned trial Judge to resolve the conflict in the traditional evidence of the parties."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

This reinforces Principle 427 while adding evidentiary dimension. Previous judgments on related matters, though not res judicata (binding on current parties), are relevant evidence for resolving conflicting traditional histories. They constitute: “acts in recent times” (see Principle 427) showing which traditional history was historically recognized, evidence of how customary practices were understood, and objective reference points for testing competing oral histories. The judgments don’t bind parties in new litigation (not res judicata between these parties) but are: relevant evidence on customary law/practice, probative of historical facts, and useful for resolving conflicts. This serves: providing documentary evidence supplementing oral tradition, offering objective verification of competing claims, and testing traditional histories against judicial recognition. Courts properly use previous judgments to: identify which history aligns with past judicial findings, assess consistency of claims over time, and weigh competing oral accounts. However, previous judgments are: evidence not conclusive proof, one factor among others, and must be evaluated with all evidence. This principle permits courts to consider judicial history in customary/traditional disputes, enhancing reliability beyond pure oral testimony.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE