PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

It is settled law that where an agent or servant is allowed to occupy premises belonging to his principal for the more convenient performance of his duties, he acquires no estate therein. He is merely a licensee and he has no right to continue to remain in the premises on the cessation of his employment. Consequently, he cannot maintain an action in trespass against his employer in the event of his eviction.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Edozie, JSC, in Nwana v. FCDA & Ors (2004) NLC-1691999(SC) at p. 11; Paras A–B.
"It is settled law that where an agent or servant is allowed to occupy premises belonging to his principal for the more convenient performance of his duties, he acquires no estate therein. He is merely a licensee and he has no right to continue to remain in the premises on the cessation of his employment. Consequently, he cannot maintain an action in trespass against his employer in the event of his eviction."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

This affirms that an employee occupying employer-provided premises for convenient performance of duties is merely a licensee, not a tenant or owner, and acquires no estate or proprietary interest in the land. Upon cessation of employment (retirement, resignation, or dismissal), the licence is automatically terminated, and the former employee cannot sue the employer in trespass for eviction. This serves: protecting employers’ proprietary rights over their premises, preventing former employees from asserting rights they never possessed, and maintaining the distinction between licence and leasehold interests. This prevents: former employees from occupying employer property indefinitely, converting employment-related occupancy into proprietary claims, and using trespass actions to resist lawful eviction. The court cannot: imply a tenancy where only a licence existed, or protect a licensee against the licensor’s right to possession. Effect: A licensee whose licence has terminated has no legal right to remain and cannot maintain any possessory action against the licensor, including trespass.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE