PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

The principle which the much cited case of Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223 is authority for, in the final analysis, is one of drawing inference from proved facts of the probability of truth of one of two or several competing traditional histories. Lord Denning in that case said at p. 1226-1227: 'Where there is a conflict of traditional history the best way to test the traditional history is by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of two competing histories is the more probable.'

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ayoola, JSC, in Chikere & Ors v. Okegbe & Ors (2000) NLC-261995(SC) at p. 6; Paras A–B.
"The principle which the much cited case of Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223 is authority for, in the final analysis, is one of drawing inference from proved facts of the probability of truth of one of two or several competing traditional histories. Lord Denning in that case said at p. 1226-1227: 'Where there is a conflict of traditional history the best way to test the traditional history is by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of two competing histories is the more probable.'"
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Kojo II v. Bonsie establishes that competing traditional histories are tested by reference to recent established facts. Where traditional evidence conflicts, the court determines which version is more probable based on contemporary evidence—documents, acts of ownership, possession patterns, and other proven facts. This approach recognizes the limitations of oral tradition while providing objective criteria for resolution. The probability test, not mere assertion, guides the court. Recent facts serve as an anchor, making the determination less speculative. This principle is fundamental in land dispute resolution.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE