PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

There is no duty, contrary to what was suggested in the particulars of the first count, on the respondent to transfer the patient to another hospital merely because she had refused to submit herself to blood transfusion by reason of her religious belief. An inadequate consideration of the law as it now stands has no doubt misled the Tribunal into assuming that a 'bigger centre' would have been free from the constraints of legal inhibition so as to be able to brush aside the patient's right and override her decision. As rightly held by the court below, the respondent was not influenced by his personal belief in failing to effect blood transfusion to the patient. His only inhibition, it would appear, was the legal inhibition that would have operated on any other medical practitioner, or hospital, as it did him and Dr. Okafor of Kenayo Hospital before him. The charge is misconceived in implying that a bigger centre would have been free from the legal inhibition which operated on the respondent in failing to override the patient's decision. Even bigger hospitals have to respect the patient's decision and choice.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ayoola, JSC, in Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Okonkwo (2001) NLC-2131999(SC) at p. 38; Paras A–D.
"There is no duty, contrary to what was suggested in the particulars of the first count, on the respondent to transfer the patient to another hospital merely because she had refused to submit herself to blood transfusion by reason of her religious belief. An inadequate consideration of the law as it now stands has no doubt misled the Tribunal into assuming that a 'bigger centre' would have been free from the constraints of legal inhibition so as to be able to brush aside the patient's right and override her decision. As rightly held by the court below, the respondent was not influenced by his personal belief in failing to effect blood transfusion to the patient. His only inhibition, it would appear, was the legal inhibition that would have operated on any other medical practitioner, or hospital, as it did him and Dr. Okafor of Kenayo Hospital before him. The charge is misconceived in implying that a bigger centre would have been free from the legal inhibition which operated on the respondent in failing to override the patient's decision. Even bigger hospitals have to respect the patient's decision and choice."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

A medical practitioner has no duty to transfer a patient who refuses treatment on religious grounds to another hospital. The legal inhibition—respecting patient consent—applies equally to all hospitals, regardless of size. A bigger centre would not be free to override the patient’s decision. The charge was misconceived. The practitioner’s failure to transfuse was based on legal inhibition, not personal belief. The principle respects patient autonomy across all healthcare settings. Transferring the patient would not circumvent the legal requirement for consent. The practitioner cannot be disciplined for respecting the patient’s rights. The same legal constraints bind all practitioners. The principle protects practitioners from liability for honouring patient refusal.

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