PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Counsel therefore being ordinarily retained to conduct a cause without any limitation, the apparent authority with which he is clothed when he appears to conduct the cause is to do everything which in the exercise of his discretion, he may think best for the interest of his client in the conduct of the cause; and if within the limits of this apparent authority he enters into agreement with the opposite counsel as to the cause, on every principle this agreement should be binding.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in Afegbai v. A.G., Edo State & Anor (2001) NLC-1111996(SC) at p. 19; Paras C–D.
"Counsel therefore being ordinarily retained to conduct a cause without any limitation, the apparent authority with which he is clothed when he appears to conduct the cause is to do everything which in the exercise of his discretion, he may think best for the interest of his client in the conduct of the cause; and if within the limits of this apparent authority he enters into agreement with the opposite counsel as to the cause, on every principle this agreement should be binding."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Counsel has apparent authority to bind their client to agreements made in the course of conducting the cause, within the scope of their discretion. Such agreements are binding on the client. This includes procedural agreements, admissions, and settlements, unless the client expressly limited counsel’s authority. The opposing party is entitled to rely on counsel’s apparent authority. The client’s remedy is against counsel for exceeding authority, not against the opposing party. This principle ensures orderly litigation and finality of agreements made through counsel. The court will not set aside such agreements unless fraud or mistake is shown.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE