LEGAL PRINCIPLE: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION — Ouster Clauses — Strict Construction of Provisions Ousting Court Jurisdiction
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
Being an ouster clause, the provision must be construed strictly, and very strictly too. Ouster clauses must not be construed liberally, or loosely, or wantonly.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Kutigi, JSC, in Kotoye v. Saraki & Anor (1994) NLC-1471993(SC) at pp. 7–8; Paras E–A.
"There is no doubt at all that section 11 (ibid) sought to oust the jurisdiction of the court to entertain matters in respect of registered shareholders in banks. Therefore being an ouster clause, the provision will have to be construed strictly and very strictly too (see Barclays Bank v. C.B.N. (1976) 1 All NLR 409. Ouster clauses must not be construed liberally, or loosely or wantonly. And that is what I have endeavoured to do in this case."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Ouster clauses that seek to remove court jurisdiction must be construed strictly and very strictly. They cannot be interpreted liberally, loosely, or wantonly. The principle applies to statutory interpretation. The rule protects access to courts and judicial power. Any ambiguity in an ouster clause must be resolved against ousting jurisdiction. Courts will not readily infer legislative intent to remove judicial oversight.
