Alhaji Muhammadu Maigari Dingyadi & Anor v. Independent National Electoral Commission & Ors
CASE IDENTIFICATION
EDITORIAL SUMMARY
Editorial — not part of the judgment as delivered
Facts of the Case
The applicants, Alhaji Muhammadu Maigari Dingyadi and the Democratic Peoples Party, filed an application before the Supreme Court on 17th December 2010 seeking an order setting aside a portion of the Court’s judgment delivered on 26th November 2010. The impugned portion dismissed Appeal No. CA/S/EP/Gov/10/09 pending before the Court of Appeal, Sokoto on the ground of abuse of court process. The applicants contended that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto, as there was no appeal before the Supreme Court from that division, and that by virtue of Section 246(3) of the 1999 Constitution, the Court of Appeal is the final court in gubernatorial election appeals.
The background facts revealed that the applicants had pursued multiple actions simultaneously on the same subject matter arising from the interpretation of the Court of Appeal Kaduna’s judgment in Appeal No. CA/K/EP/Gov/60/07 delivered on 11th April 2008. The applicants had appeals pending before both the Abuja Division (CA/A/276/08) and Sokoto Division (CA/S/EP/Gov/10/09) of the Court of Appeal between the same parties and on the same subject matter. The Supreme Court had earlier on 4th June 2010 found this constituted an abuse of court process and stayed the Sokoto appeal. The respondents subsequently urged the Supreme Court to make a consequential order dismissing the Sokoto appeal when the applicants sought to withdraw their interlocutory appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issues for Determination
ISSUE 1: Whether by the combined effect of Sections 233 and 246(3) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to dismiss Appeal No. CA/S/EP/Gov/10/09 which was pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto.
ISSUE 2: Whether the present application of the applicants falls within the category of exceptional situations where the Supreme Court can set aside its judgment.
ISSUE 3: Whether the entire application is not a gross abuse of the process of the court.
Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court dismissed the application in its entirety for lacking in merit. The Court held that the portion of the judgment sought to be set aside was properly made pursuant to the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process. The Court found that none of the recognised exceptions for setting aside a Supreme Court judgment applied to the circumstances of this case, and that the Court had become functus officio having effectively decided the matter on 26th November 2010. No order as to costs was made.
Ratio Decidendi / Principles
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Finality of Judgment — Supreme Court Becoming Functus Officio
“The court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted.”
Per Galadima, JSC, in Dingyadi & Ors v. INEC & Ors (2011) NLC-123-32-2010(SC) at pp. 49—50; Paras E—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Review of Supreme Court Judgment — Exceptional Circumstances for Setting Aside
“The Supreme Court can set aside its judgment in the following circumstances: (a) when the judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit either in the court or of one or more of the parties; (b) where the judgment is a nullity and a person affected by the order of court which can be described as a nullity is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside; (c) when it is obvious that the court was misled into giving judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it; (d) where the judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction; (e) where the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Dingyadi & Ors v. INEC & Ors (2011) NLC-123-32-2010(SC) at pp. 19—20; Paras E—A.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Abuse of Court Process — Multiplicity of Actions — Power of Supreme Court to Dismiss Abusive Process
“Once a court is satisfied that the proceeding before it amounts to an abuse of process, it has the right, in fact the duty to invoke its coercive powers to punish the party which is in abuse of its process. Quite often, that power is exercised by a dismissal of the action which constitutes the abuse.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Dingyadi & Ors v. INEC & Ors (2011) NLC-123-32-2010(SC) at pp. 15—16; Paras E—A.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Inherent Powers of Court — Power to Prevent Abuse of Process
“The court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its legal process by frivolous or vexatious proceedings either in this court or in any other court brought to its attention. This court derived its powers to make a pronouncement on the Sokoto appeal from the 1999 Constitution, the Supreme Court Act, Supreme Court Rules and its inherent powers pursuant to Section 6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Dingyadi & Ors v. INEC & Ors (2011) NLC-123-32-2010(SC) at pp. 6—7; Paras E—A.
EVIDENCE LAW — Judicial Precedent — Stare Decisis — Binding Effect on Lower Courts
“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, lower courts are bound by the theory of precedent. It is in effect a doctrine which enjoins judges to stand by their decisions and the decisions of their predecessors however wrong they are and whatever injustice they inflict. All courts established under the constitution derive their powers and authority from the constitution. The hierarchy of courts shows the limit and powers of each court.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Dingyadi & Ors v. INEC & Ors (2011) NLC-123-32-2010(SC) at pp. 30—31; Paras E—A.
JURISDICTION — Abuse of Court Process — Jurisdictional Importance
“Abuse of legal process is of jurisdictional importance as where a condition for initiating a legal process is laid down, any suit instituted in contravention of the precondition provision is incompetent and a court of law lacks jurisdiction to entertain the same.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Dingyadi & Ors v. INEC & Ors (2011) NLC-123-32-2010(SC) at p. 17; Paras A—B.
Obiter Dicta
Per Adekeye, JSC at pp. 32-33; Paras D-E: “Political matters are highly sensitive and equally sui generis. This court has observed a new and unique species of abuse of Court/legal process in the form of forum Shopping. In the light of section 14(1) and 14(2)(a)(c), this court cannot close its eyes and allow desperate individuals to wrongly use the courts to secure a mandate otherwise denied them after going through the process of free and fair election at the polls.”
Orders of Court
(1) The application filed on 17th December 2010 was dismissed for lacking in merit.
(2) No order as to costs.
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Appellant(s)
Chief Akin Olujinmi, SAN (with him, Mr. Rickey Tarfa, SAN, O. Jolaawo, Ifeanyi Egwasi (Esq.), Sulaiman Usman, Akinsola Olujinmi, M. Ibrahim, Akinyemi Olujinmi, Y. Pitan, E. Nduku (Mrs.), Femi Atetedaye, Toyin Fameso (Miss), Ayodele Akisaya, Omolara Adeogun (Miss), Adetutu Aina (Miss), Esther Enoch (Miss), A. Okubote (Esq.), A. Fakoya (Esq.), R.T. Sai-Sulaiman (Mrs.), B.A. Oyin, I.O. Okebukola (Miss), G.A. Ashaolu (Esq.), Kemi Odegbami (Miss), Ifeoma Ugboaja (Esq.)
Counsel for the Respondent(s)
• 1st Respondent: Mr. Yahaya Mahmood (with him, Vivian Bosah) • 2nd Respondent: Dr. Oladapo Olanipekun (with him, J.U. Ajii, K.N. Azie, A. Adesina and Aisha Ali (Miss)) • 3rd Respondent: Dr. Alex Izinyon, SAN (with him, B.K. Abu, Hanatu Abdul-Rahaman (Miss))
Amicus Curiae
None
JUDGMENTS / OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Authoritative judicial text as delivered
Lead / Majority Opinion
— (DELIVERED BY OLUFUNLOLA OYELOLA ADEKEYE, J.S.C (DELIVERING THE LEAD JUDGMENT): )
Concurring Opinion(s)
— M. CHUKWUMA-ENEH, J.S.C:
The background, the facts as well as the submissions/arguments of the parties in this matter have been so comprehensively captured and set out in the lead judgment that I need do no more than adopt the same for this short contribution.
Before now I have had the advantage of a preview of the lead judgment prepared and delivered by my learned brother Adekeye JSC.
However, the sum-up of the instant application filed by the applicants/appellants in the substantive appeal is for an order –
“setting aside the portion or part of the judgment of the court delivered on 26th day of November, 2010 dismissing Appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto on the ground of abuse of court process”.
The foregoing abstract represents part of the consequential order as declared by this court in its Ruling of 26/11/2010. The applicants have as it were, enlisted 11 (eleven) grounds in attacking the said order in the instant application.
P.37
In their concluding submissions on the application the applicants have specifically contended that the said order of 26/11/2010 having been made without jurisdiction is a nullity and also that the procedure adopted leading to the dismissal of the appeal has deprived the decision of the character of a legitimate adjudication and for so submitting they have referred to and relied on Oduko v. Government of Ebonyi State (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt.1147) 439 at 452, Madukolu v. Nkemdilim & Ors. (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, Attorney-General of Anambra State v. Attorney General of the Federation (2007) 2 NWLR (P1.1047) 4 at p.80, Stanconsult (Nig) Ltd. v. Secondy Ukey (1981) SC.6 and Okafor & Ors. V. Attorney-General of Anambra State & Ors. (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.200) at 59 at 680. The respondents in the substantive appeal are still the respondents in the instant application.
For purposes of maintaining a proper focus in dealing with this matter I think, I should set out also the issues as identified by the parties in their respective briefs of argument in this application.
The appellants have raised the following poser:
“whether by the combined effect of Sections 233 and 248(3) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, the court had jurisdiction to dismiss appeal No. CA/S/EP/Gov/10/2009 which was pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto.”
The 2nd respondent on his part has set out two issues for determination as fellows:
“(1) Whether the honourable court has the jurisdiction and/on the vires to grant the main prayer sought in the applicants’ application.
(2) Whether the entire application is not a gross abuse of the process of the court.”
The 3rd respondent in its initial reaction to the application has canvassed the following grounds in its preliminary objection in opposition to the application, that:
P.37
(1) The application is an abuse of court process, frivolous, vexatious and a waste of time of this court.
(2) All the grounds on which the application is predicated had been canvassed and expatiated upon by the appellants/applicants after which the respondents counsel respectively addressed the court on them on the 14th of October 2010, and this honourable court delivered its judgment on the 26th of November, 2010.
(3) There is no pending appeal in any division of the Court of Appeal on which the present appeal can be hinged.
(a) The motion is incompetent and the Supreme Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain it.
These grounds have been argued in the brief along with the response to the main argument on the application. However, in the event of the objection being overruled, the 3rd respondent has also raised two issues for determination, to wit:
“(1) Whether the Supreme Court was right to have assumed jurisdiction indeed has jurisdiction to dismiss appeal No. CA/S/EP/Gov/10/2009 which was pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto having regard to the interpretation of Section 246(3) of the Constitution, Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act.
(2) Whether the present application of the applicants falls within the category of exceptional situations where the Supreme Court can set aside its judgment.”
Having gone through the copious processes, documents, affidavits and respective exhibits filed in this matter and the submissions of the parties as per their briefs of argument thereof, I am of the considered view and in this regard, I agree with the respondents that the grounds upon which the instant application is predicated are no different from the grounds as expatiated upon in the earlier proceedings as covered by the Ruling of 26/11/2010 and that as there is no pending appeal in any Division of the Court of Appeal on which the present application can be predicated, the instant application appears baseless and incompetent.
P.38
It is clear that the true purport of the instant application is for this court to sit on appeal over its order when it has become functus officio. And surely there must be an end to litigation.
It is in this regard that I must observe that the entire record of the proceedings in the appeal No. CA/S/EP/Gov/10/2009 from the Election Petition Tribunal and CA/A/276/2008 before the Court of Appeal Abuja have been placed before this court, that is to say in the application preceding the Ruling of this court of 26/11/2010. And so this court has been seised of enough materials that have enable it to proceed to make the instant order, inter alia in the interest of justice of the matter. Hence, having cited the case of Registered Trustees, Apostolic Church v. Olewolemi (1990) 6 NWLR (pt.158) 514 at 531 in the said Ruling of 26/11/2010, I have taken pains to emphasise that it is trite that a court as this court cannot award more than has been claimed and that it is misconceived to posit that an order cannot be made in favour of a defendant merely because he has not filed a Counter- Claim in a matter. And that an order in favour of a defendant where he has not so counter-claimed must flow from the evidence before the court as in the instant matter. The instant consequential order has followed from the evidence before the court.
Against the backdrop of all the issues raised in this matter, it is settled that the circumstances under which a court can interfere with its decision by reviewing or correcting any apparent error(s) in a court’s decision is by way of appeal. However, this is subject to the inherent power of the court exercisable under the principle of ‘Slip Rule’ to correct of accidental slips or mistakes/omissions.
P.39
Thus, it has defined the narrow compass of a court’s operational limit within the principle of Slip Rule vis-a-vis albeit in regard to reviewing or correcting of its decisions. It must be pointed out that the inherent power of a court under the Slip Rule has to be construed strictly.
In short it entails correcting of any clerical errors, mistakes or some errors arising from any accidental slips or omissions or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to the intention of the court. The issue here is whether the nature of the review as contemplated in the instant application can come within the ambit of the principle of Slip Rule as defined herein. My answer to this poser is in the negative in view of the violence it will do to the considered findings of this court in the Rulings of 4/6/2010 and 26/11/2010.
It should be noted that the scope of the principle of slip rule does not allow a count as this court to reconsider its decision all over again. Nor is it used as a cause for staging a second thought on the matter; otherwise it is settled by the provisions of Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules that the decisions of this court in all matters, to all intent and purposes, is final and Order 8 Rule 16 (supra) provides that:
“The court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a deferent form substituted”.
P.40
The provisions of the above Rule are plain and far from being ambiguous and viewed from the decisions of this court in Chukwuka v. Ezulike (1986) 5 NWLR (pt.45) 897; (1986) 2 NSCC (pt.17) 1347, Adigun v. Attorney-General of Oyo State No.2 (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.56) 197 and Adigun v. The Government of Osun State (1995) 3 NWLR (pt.385) 513 that have construed these provisions and similar provisions in pari materia, it is clear that apart from the Limited scope under the Slip Rule and as specifically provided in the said Rule this court as a general principle cannot review its decisions. Its decision once reached and pronounced is final. This is also particularly and literally so as provided pursuant to the provisions of Section 235 of the 1999 Constitution which in clear terms read, that:
“… no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Court.”
Meaning in effect that the decision of this court is final.
In Chukwuka & Ors. V. Ezulike & Ors. (Supra) this court at page 1353 per Uwais JSC (as he then was) has stated the law on the finality of this court’s decisions thus:
“There is no appeal in the court against the decision of 12th November 1985 and it is obvious that there cannot be such an appeal since no jurisdiction has been conferred upon this court to sit on appeal over its own decision, no matter how manifestly wrong the decision may be. See Paul Cardoso v. John Bankole Daniel & Ors. (1986) 2 NWLR 1 at p.28 (it proceeded to quote from it as follows)… ‘Consequently, it is clear that we cannot by submissions made by Chief Williams hold that the decision of this court of 12th November, 1985 is a nullity by virtue of the appeal itself being competent and this court lacking in jurisdiction. However, this is not to say that the court’ cannot in a subsequent and different case depart from its decision in a previous case, if the principle laid down for such departure apply. See Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR 273 at 325. But that is not the same as setting aside or declare a nullity the decision in the previous case’.” (Underlining for emphasis).
P.41
The foregoing pertinent pronouncement has directly been impinged upon by the singular prayer in this application, that is, to set aside the consequential order made in the Ruling of this court on 26/11/2010 as a nullity for having been made as contended by the applicants, without jurisdiction and that the decision has been deprived of a legitimate adjudication amongst other grounds contained in the applications. As the power of review is not at large the courts must watch it, unless the review comes within the limited scope of slip rule and the exceptions I will come to anon. The upshot of the matter is that the said order in the storm’s eye in these proceedings, no matter how manifestly wrong the order may be it is ultimately, final as the court becomes functus officio vis-a-vis the said Ruling. Besides, this court cannot alter the instant decision of 26/11/2010 under the guise of reviewing its decision as that would tantamount to undermining the Ruling of 26/11/2010 vis-a-vis the clear intention of this court arrived at on the materials placed before it. Even then to do so as sought in the applicants’ application will render the decision in the Ruling of 26/11/2010 on the issue of abuse of process completely nugatory. In that scenario this court I must point out cannot sit on appeal over it’s a decision/order. Meaning that there is no way this court can come to terms with the nature of the review contemplated in the instant application in the face of the brazen acts of abuse of court process in the matter.
The foregoing conclusion in this matter, does not ipso facto preclude a party in concurrence with the principle as laid down in tire case of Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (supra) asking the court in a subsequent and different case to depart from its decision or order in a previous case and as rightly held in the immediate cited case; it is not the same as per the instant application to set aside the decision/order of this court on grounds of nullity.
P.42
It is against the foregoing background of my findings herein that I hold the view that the instant application is totally misconceived and should be dismissed.
All the same there are recognized exceptions where this court exercise of its inherent jurisdiction can set aside its decisions albeit appropriate cases and the exceptions include.
(i) where the decision/order is obtained by fraud or deceit either of the court or a party. See Olufunmise v. Falana (1990) 3 NWLR (pt.136) 1, Alaka v. Adekunle (1959) LL.R.76 and Flower v. Lloyd (1877) 6 Ch.D 297.
(ii) where the decision/order is a nullity and a person affected by the decision/order is entitled ex debito justitiae to have the decision/order set aside. See Skenconsult Ltd. v. Ukey (1991) 1 SC.6 and Okafor & ors. v. Anambra state & ors. (1991) 6 NWLR (P1.2000) 659 at 680, Craig v. Kamsen (1943) KB 256 At 262-263, Ojiako & Ors. v. Ogueze (1962) 1 SCNLR 112.
(iii) Where the court is misled into making decision/order under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it – Agunbaiade v. Okunogu & Co. (1961) ANLR 110 and Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) 1 ANLR 250, and
(iv) where the decision/order is given without jurisdiction; and
(v) Where the procedure adopted is such as to deprive the decision/order the character of a legitimate decision. See: Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 14 NWLR (pt.787) 435 and Aloa v. ACB Ltd. (2000) 9 NWLR (pt.672) 264.
I must respectfully hold that having examined the instant application vis-a-vis the above mentioned exceptions it is clear that the case of the applicants as encapsulated in their application is not cognizable under any of the foregoing exceptions. And I so hold.
P.43
For all these reasons and so much more ably set out in the lead judgment of my learned brother Adekeye JSC, just delivered this application is without any merit. It is accordingly refused and is hereby dismissed abide by the orders contained in the lead judgment.
P.44
— A. FABIYI, J.S.C:
I have had a preview of the Ruling just handed out by my learned brother – Adekeye, JSC. I agree with the reasons therein adumbrated and the conclusion arrived at that the application should be dismissed.
The application filed on 17th December, 2010 by the applicants prayed for an order of this court as follows:-
“Setting aside the portion or part of the judgment of the court delivered on 26th day of November, 2010 dismissing Appeal No. CA/S/EP/Gov/10/2009 pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto on the ground of abuse of court process.”
It is now plain to all the parties that the portion of the judgment sought to be set aside was premised on abuse of court process as found by another panel of this court on 4th June, 2010. The applicants have not challenged the finding that there was abuse of court process perpetuated by them. They appear to concede same. In a rather subtle manner, they contend that this court should fold its hands and do nothing. That stance cannot be supported both in law and even logic. This court has inherent jurisdiction to act under the combined provisions of section 22 of the Supreme Court Act and section 6 (6) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The inherent jurisdiction imbued in this court is intrinsic to its very existence. See Adigun v. Attorney- General Oyo State (No.2) (1957) 2NWLR (pt. 56) 197 at 235.
P.44
It is not in doubt that this court has a binding duty to halt and terminate, on application by a parry, any proceeding that is found to amount to abuse of process as herein. This court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process by frivolous and/or vexatious proceedings before it or in any other court whenever it is brought before it as done herein. See the case of Agwasin v. Ojichie (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 613 at 625.
Having made the order dismissing the appeal in Sokoto Court of Appeal based on abuse of Court process which the applicants concede, should it now be set aside? I think not as same will open the lee-way for the continued perpetuation of the same abuse of process. That will not be in tandem with reason. It can open a gate for further drift in the polity.
This court will not vary its order which put an end to the abuse of process that the applicants are not challenging; in the main.
For the above reasons and the fuller ones carefully set out by my brother, I feel that the application which constitutes a further abuse has no modicum of chance to warrant the order sought by the applicants. I join in dismissing the application for lack of merit. The applicants should appreciate that there should be an end to strife and ensuing litigation. No order on costs.
P.45
— SULEIMAN GALADIMA, J.S.C:
The Applicants herein in their application filed on 21st February, 2011 are praying for an order.
“Setting aside the portion or part of the judgment of this court delivered on 26th day of November, 2010 dismissing Appeal No. CA/S/EP/Gov/10/2009 pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto on the ground of abuse of court process”.
P.46
As set out on the body of the motion, the grounds of the application are:
(i) The only way the Supreme Court can entertain a matter is by way of an appeal to it from the decision of the Court of Appeal in specified circumstances under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
(ii) There was no such appeal.
(iii) Appeal No.CA/S/EP/GOV/10/19 was not before this court and this court could not have exercised any jurisdiction on same.
(iv) Appeal No.CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 concerned an election petition challenging the Governorship election held in Sokoto state in 2008.
(v) The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to deal with any gubernatorial election appeal as by Section 246(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the Court of Appeal is the final court in such appeals;
(vi) The order under reference was made in breach and violation of Section 233(1) and 245(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
(vii) It is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and not the Supreme Court Act that governs the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Gubernatorial Election Matters.
(viii) This Honourable Court has consistently held, both before and after the decision in this case, that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on or entertain an Election Petition Appeal in respect of Governorship Election, even if there is an issue of jurisdiction as held in Appeal No.SC./143/2010 between Hon. Sunday Ugwa & Anor v. Hon. Oji Lekwauwa & ors (unreported), delivered on 3rd day of December, 2010.
(ix) A court that has made an order without jurisdiction to set aside that order.
(x) Supreme Court authorities exist to the effect that both pre and post election matters can be pursued concurrently; and
(xi) The application raises a very fundamental issue of jurisdiction”.
P.45
In supporting the application an affidavit of 45-paragraphs and Exhibits A, B, and C were filed. A joint brief of argument and a Reply brief were also filed by the applicants and the Respondents respectively.
Having identified the foregoing processes, learned Senior Counsel for the Applicants adopted same. He outlined the background facts leading to this application. He submitted that the central issue in the application is whether by the combined effect of Sections 233 and 246 (3) of the 1999 constitution and section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, this Court can be said to have jurisdiction to dismiss Appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 which was pending before Court of Appeal, Sokoto. He argued with emphasis, that when this court dismissed the appellants’ appeal after withdrawal, there was no longer an appeal before it to make consequential order. Relying on the case of Akinbobola v. Plisson Fisco (Nig.) Ltd (1999) 1NWLR PT 167, Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that after the order of dismissal was made, the next step was to proceed to make order as to costs and no further order could be made as there was no decision on the merits in the matter. It is submitted that this court has no power to dismiss the appeal pending and before the Court of Appeal Sokoto (as constituting an abuse of Court Process) as such pronouncement can only be made in respect of matters strictly before it. That the Sokoto Appeal was not an appeal before this court in respect of which section 22 of the Supreme Court Act can be predicated. That the Sokoto Appeal was referred to in the judgment of this court delivered on 4/5/2010 (Exh. C) as an “election petition”, whereupon the Court of Appeal is the final court by virtue of Section 246(3) of the 1999 Constitution.
P.46
It is urged that this court is in a Position to grant this application as it is within its ambit to exercise that discretion so much so that the portion of order making the judgment being sought to be set aside was made without jurisdiction which makes it a nullity. This contention was supported by a number of decisions of this court, some of which are Madukolu v. Nkemdilim & Ors. (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 Oduko v. Government of Ebonyi State (2009) 9 NWLR (pt.1147) p,439 at p.452, Our Line Ltd v. S.C.C. (Nig.) Ltd (2009) 17NWLR (pt.1170) p.382 at p. 404; Sken Consult (Nig.) Ltd v. Secondy Ukey (1981) SC.6. Nwosu v. Udeaja & Ors (1991) 1 NWLR. (pt. 125) p.188; Okafor 7 Ors v. A – G. Anambra State & Ors (1991) 6 NWLR (pt.200) p.559 and Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 14 NWLR. (pt.787 (p.435 at 453 -454. On section 246(3) some of the cases relied on by the applicants are: Onuaguluchi v. Ndu (2001) TNWLR (pt.712) 309; Awuse v. Odili (2003) L8 NWLR (pt.851) 116 at 174, Umanah v. Attah (2006) 17NWLR (pt.1009) 503 at 527- 528; Okonkwo v. Ngige (2007) 12NWLR (pt.1047) 191, 208 – 209; Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5NWLR (pt.1080) p.227 at pp.333 – 334; and Ugwa and Anor v. Lekwauwa & Ors (unreported judgment of this court delivered on 3/12/2010).
Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent, YAHAYA MAHMOOD Esq. in opposition to this application filed a Notice of preliminary objection on 19/1/2011 followed by a counter affidavit of 14/2/2011 and 1st Respondent’s Brief of the same date. These processes were adopted and relied upon in asking this court to dismiss the application. He gave in great details the background facts leading to this instant application. This is ably set out in the lead ruling. The learned counsel on his part gave a good prelude and background necessary for the understanding of the instant application brought by the Appellants.
P.47
The summary and pith of the argument of the learned counsel is that this court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its legal process by frivolous or vexatious proceedings either in its court or any other court brought to its attention. It was not shown by the Applicants that this Court does not derive its inherent powers to make a pronouncement on the Sokoto appeal, in the overall circumstances of the case. On the finality of a Supreme Court decision, the learned counsel submitted that, once this court has decided a matter before and there is no ambiguity or slip to be corrected, the court cannot re-open it. Reliance was placed on the case of Adigun v. Secretary Iwo Local Government. (1999) 6 NWLR (pt.613) 30 at 37. Contending that this application as an abuse of the process of this court, Learned Counsel has urged this court to dismiss the said application.
On his part, the Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondents, Dr, Dapo Olanipekun Esq., referred to the Notice of preliminary objection, a Counter affidavit and their brief. Having stated briefly the facts giving rise to this application, learned counsel submitted that this court has no jurisdiction and vires to grant the prayer now being sought to set aside by the applicants. That the entire application is a gross abuse of the process of this court, as it is premised on the same grounds and arguments earlier canvassed by the applicants before this court delivered its ruling on 4/6/2010. That this application ought to be dismissed.
Learned Senior Counsel for the 3rd Respondent, Dr. Alex Izinyon also filed a Notice of preliminary objection on 1/2/2011, a counter affidavit and 3rd Respondent’s brief on 1712/2011 in reaction and opposition to this application.
P.48
Four grounds canvassed in the 3rd Respondent’s preliminary objection are as follows:-
(i). That the application is an abuse of court process, frivolous vexatious and a waste of the time of this court.
(ii). That all the grounds on which the application is predicated had been canvassed and expatiated upon by the appellants/applicants after which the respondents’ counsel respectively addressed the court on them on the 14/10/2010; and this court delivered its judgment on 26/11/2010.
(iii). There is no pending appeal in any Division of the Court of Appeal on which the present appeal can be hinged.
(iv). The motion is incompetent and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.
In the 3rd Respondents’ brief the learned senior counsel gave a brief summary of the facts. The learned senior counsel considered the Ruling of this court delivered on 26/11/2010 on which the application of the applicants of 14/12/2010 was based. He submitted that the present application praying this court for an order to set aside that portion of the judgment dismissing Appeal No.CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 is an abuse of court process. Like the other learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, learned senior counsel has urged this court to dismiss the application.
Each counsel for the respondents respectively filed a Notice of preliminary objection. Their common ground for the dismissal of this application is because the application in abuse of the process of this court and also for the reason that the applicants had vehemently canvassed on all these grounds now raised and relied on in this application and parties had addressed the court on 14/10/2010 before the judgment of 26/11/2010 was delivered dismissing Appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/10/2009 pending before, the Court of Appeal Sokoto.
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This point has been raised in the Notice of preliminary objection filed by the respective respondents. This crucial observation of the learned counsel for the learned counsel for the respondents can be verified from the records of this court in Appeal No.SC/32 /2010.
The decisions of this court under searchlight in this application are Alhaji Muhammadu Maigari Dingyadi & 1Or. v. INEC & 2Ors, delivered on 4/6/2010 and Alhaji Muhammadu Maigari Dingyadi & Or. v. INEC & 2Ors delivered on 26/tt/2010. These are now reported in the Law Reports. These cases, without going into the details, no doubt, provide a convenient platform and basis for the consequential order made by this court on 26/11/2010. It is that judgment that the applicant is now praying that it be set aside, particularly the “portion or part of the judgment” dismissing the Appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/10/2009 pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto, on the ground of abuse of court process. This case is now reported as Dingyadi v. INEC (No.2) (2011) 18 NWLR (pt.1224) p.154,
I have carefully and dispassionately considered this application. I have considered various submissions and various authorities relied upon by the parties and the relevant law and rules guiding the subject matter. The power of this court to review its judgment is contained in order 8 rule 1-6 of Rules of this court. It provides:
“The court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention.”
This court in a number of cases has decided that it becomes functus officio on matter already decided by it. Such matter cannot be reopened for review under any guise except to correct or modify its own order on the ground that the order, judgment did not represent what it had intended to record.
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Thus it may correct clerical errors to make the meaning clear, if it is obscure. This is a final court. See Oyeyipo v. Oyinloye (1987) 1NWLR (pt.50) B56, Chukwuka & Ors v. Ezulike (1985) 17 NSCC (pt.11) 347 at 1352 – 1353. Ovenseri v. Osagiede (1998) 11 NWLR (pt.572) p.1 and A.D.H. Ltd v. Amalgamated Trustees Ltd (2007) ALL F.W.L.R. (pt.392) 1781 at 1828.
However even though this court cannot sit over its judgment or review it once delivered, it does not preclude the court from departing from its former decision in a previous case it the principles laid down for such departure apply. This departure from the previous decision is not setting aside or declaring a nullity the decision in the previous case: See Akinsanya v. UBA Ltd (1986) 4NWLR (pt.35) 273 at323; Chukwuka v. Ezulike (1985) (Supra).
The foregoing are the general principles. Regardless of these general guiding principles, this court, as already noticed, possess inherent power to set aside its judgment, in appropriate cases or situations namely:
(1). Where the judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit either in the court or by one or more of the parties. See Olufunmise v. Falana (1990) 3NWLR (Pt.135) P.1.
(2). Where the judgment is a nullity, then the person affected by the order of court which can be described as a nullity is entitled exdebito justitiae to have it set aside: Sken Consult Ltd v. Ukey (1981) 1SC.6. Craig v. Kamsen (1943) L KB. 256, 262 – 263. Okafor & Ors. v. Anambra State & Ors. (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 2000) p.659 at p.580.
(3) To mislead the court into giving judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it: Obimomire v. Erinosho (1965) l All NLR p.250.
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(4). Where the judgment was given in the clear absence of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.
(5). Where the procedure adopted by the court was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication: Igwe v. Kalu (2000) 14 NWLR (pt.787) 435 and Kalu v. ACB (2000)9 NWLR (pt.672) p.264.
I have carefully considered the foregoing requirements. None of these is applicable to the judgment of this court delivered on 26/11/2010.
For the foregoing and fuller reasons ably expounded by my learned brother Adekeye, JSC in the lead judgment; I agree that the application is unmeritorious and it is dismissed. I too, shall award no costs to the Respondents.
P.52
— BODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C:
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the leading Ruling delivered by my learned brother Adekeye, JSC. I agree with the reasoning and conclusions. propose, though to add only a few observations. By an application filed on the 17th of December 2010 and argued before us on the 1st of March 2011 learned counsel for the applicant, Chief A. Olujinmi, SAN seeks an order:
Setting aside the portion or part of the Judgment of this court delivered on the 26th day of November, 2010 dismissing Appeal No.CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 pending before the Court of Appeal Sokoto on the ground of Abuse of court process.
The summary of the facts have been so well set out in the leading Ruling, and so there would be no need for me to restate the obvious. Order 8 Rule 16 of the Rules of this court enables this court to review its judgment, or Ruling. This rare jurisdiction is limited to situations where:
(a) There are clerical mistakes, errors that arose from accidental slips or omission in the judgment.
(b) It becomes necessary to vary the judgment in order to give effect to the courts real meaning, thereby making the judgment clearer.
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(c) Where the judgment is obtained by fraud,
(d) Where it becomes clear that this court was misled into delivering the judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it, or
(e) Where the decision is a nullity.
Consequently once this court has decided an issue and that decision is embodied in its judgment, and that judgment has been made effective the court no longer has power to alter its decision which can no longer be questioned since its final. It would amount to chaos for this court to re-open the matter and substitute a different decision to the one already rendered. See Alao v. African continental Bank Ltd. 2000 9 NWLR pt.672 p.264 Chukwuka v. Ezulike 1986 5 NWLR pt. 45 p. 892 The portion of the Ruling sought to be set aside was premised on abuse of court process as found by another Panel of this court on the 4th of June 2010. The case is Dingvadi v. INEC (No.1) 2010 18 NWLR pt.1224 P. 1
In the Leading Ruling, I.T. Muhammad, JSC said:
“Looking at the antecedents of the matter on hand, this is what exactly the appellant/respondents had attempted to do. They went to the 1st Election Tribunal at Sokoto, they lost; they went to the Court of Appeal Kaduna, they partially succeeded; they went to the Federal High Court for interpretation of Kaduna Court of Appeal Judgment, they lost; they went to Sokoto 2nd Election Tribunal, they lost; they now appealed simultaneously to the Abuja Division, Court of Appeal and Sokoto Division, Court of Appeal. These appeals are both pending in the respective Divisions of the court of Appeal. Both appeals, from the records, are between the same parties and on the same subject matter. Haba! Can there be anything more irritating and more frustrating than this forum prostitution …?”
P.53
It is from this decision and the decision in Dingvadi v. INEC (No.2) 2010 18 NWLR pt.1224 p.154 Delivered by this court on the 26th of November 2010 that the consequential order dismissing Appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 arose. It was premised on abuse of process. That there was abuse of process was not challenged by the applicants. Indeed in Dingyadi v. INEC (No.2) supra in my concurring Ruling I said that:
“Inherent powers are powers which are not necessarily derivable from the constitution or Legislation. All superior courts of Record have inherent powers. They are powers innate in a court to ensure that the streams of justice remain pure all the time. For example, to ensure that the judicial process is not scandalized or ridiculed by unnecessary applications filed with some ulterior motive. There seems to be no answer as to why appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 should be Fending While Appeal NO: CA/A/276/2008 filed before it on the same issue is also pending…”
Heavy weather has been made on the point that it is the court where the abuse is pending that can make the consequential order to dismiss suit No: CA/S/EP/GOV/10/09 and not this court. Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal in Sokoto had no jurisdiction to pronounce on whether the 2nd respondent was qualified to contest the Election and the fact that when Chief W. Olanipekun SAN, Dr. Iziyon SAN made application to have the suit struck out, it was easy to accede to their prayer to terminate the case since the Tribunal had no jurisdiction; and the said Tribunal no longer sits (it being ad hoc). Where a court has no jurisdiction there is no point allowing the parties to be wasting their time in court. The Ruling of this court delivered on the 26th of November 2010 reported as Dingyadi v. INEC (No.2) 2010 18 NWLR pt.1224 p. 154 reflects the correct position of this court. There is thus no need to alter it.
For this and the much fuller reasoning in the Leading Ruling prepared by Adekeye, JSC, this application is dismissed. No order on costs.
P.54
Dissenting Opinion(s)
None
REFERENCES
Research enhancement — dynamically linked
Referenced Judgments
1. A-G Anambra State v. A-G Federation (2007) 12 NWLR (pt.1047) pg.4 at pg.80 – cited at pp. 4, 22
2. A.T. Ltd. v. A.D.H. Ltd. (2007) 15 NWLR (pt-1056) pg.118 at pg.183 – cited at p. 12
3. Abdullahi v. Elayo (1993) 1 NWLR (pt.1) pg.268 – cited at p. 26
4. Action Congress v. INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (pt.1048) pg.222 – cited at p. 27
5. Adesanoye v. Adewole (2000) 9 NWLR (pt.671) pg.127 – cited at pp. 8, 16
6. *Adigun v. A-G Oyo State (No.2)* (1987) 2 NWLR (pt.56) pg.197 – cited at pp. 19, 41, 44
7. Adigun v. Secretary Iwo Local Government (1999) 8 NWLR (pt.613) pg.30 – cited at pp. 8, 19, 35, 48
8. Agunbiade v. Okunoga & Co (1961) All NLR pg.110 – cited at p. 20
9. Akinbobola v. Plisson Fisco (Nig.) Ltd. (1991) 1 NWLR (pt.167) pg.270 – cited at p. 3
10. Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR (pt.35) pg.273 – cited at pp. 42, 51
11. Alaka v. Adekunle (1959) LLR 76 – cited at pp. 20, 43
12. Alao v. ACB Ltd (2000) 9 NWLR (pt.672) pg.264 – cited at pp. 12, 20, 44, 53
13. Ali v. Albishir (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1073) pg.94 – cited at p. 8
14. Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (pt.1080) pg.227 – cited at pp. 5, 27, 28, 31, 48
15. ANPP v. INEC (2004) 7 NWLR (pt.871) pg.16 – cited at p. 28
16. Anyaegbunam v. A-G Anambra State (2001) 6 NWLR (pt.710) pg.532 – cited at p. 21
17. Arubo v. Aiyeleru (1993) 3 NWLR (pt.280) pg.125 – cited at p. 16
18. Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) All NLR pg.88 – cited at p. 19
19. Awuse v. Odili (2003) 18 NWLR (pt.851) pg.116 – cited at pp. 5, 48
20. B.M. Ltd. v. Woermann Line (2009) 13 NWLR (pt.1157) pg.149 – cited at pp. 4, 22
21. Berliet (Nig) Ltd. v. Kachalla (1995) 9 NWLR (pt.420) pg.478 – cited at p. 19
22. CBN v. Ahmed (2001) 11 NWLR (pt.724) pg.369 – cited at p. 8
23. Chukwuka v. Ezulike (1986) 5 NWLR (pt.45) 897 – cited at pp. 41, 51, 53
24. Craig v. Kamsen (1943) 1 KB 256 – cited at pp. 20, 43, 52
25. Daggash v. Bulaoma (2004) 14 NWLR (pt.892) pg.144 – cited at p. 23
26. Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.843) pg.310 – cited at p. 31
27. Dingyadi v. INEC (No.1) (2010) 18 NWLR (pt.1224) pg.1 – cited at pp. 14, 23, 53
28. Dingyadi v. INEC (No.2) (2011) 18 NWLR (pt.1224) pg.154 – cited at pp. 14, 15, 16, 17, 28, 50, 54
29. Ella v. Agbo (1999) 8 NWLR (pt.613) pg.139 – cited at p. 26
30. Ezeokafor v. Ezeilo (1999) 1 NWLR (pt.619) pg.513 – cited at p. 23
31. Ezugwu v. Nwamulu (2010) 4 NWLR (pt.1183) pg.159 – cited at p. 27
32. Flower v. Lloyd (1977) 6 Ch.D 297 – cited at pp. 20, 43
33. Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 14 NWLR (pt.787) pg.435 – cited at pp. 5, 20, 43, 48, 52
34. Isoho v. Yahaya (1992) 2 NWLR (pt.600) pg.671 – cited at p. 27
35. Ivory Merchant Bank v. Partnership Investment Ltd. (1956) 5 NWLR (pt.448) pg.362 – cited at p. 17
36. Kurfiv. Mohammed (1993) 2 NWLR (pt.22) pg.602 – cited at p. 27
37. Liman v. Mohammed (1999) 9 NWLR (pt.617) pg.116 – cited at p. 16
38. Madukolu v. Nkemdilim & Ors (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 – cited at pp. 4, 18, 20, 37, 47
39. Mohammed v. Husseini (1998) 14 NWLR (pt.584) pg.108 – cited at p. 21
40. Mohammed v. Olawunmi (1993) 4 NWLR (pt.287) pg.254 – cited at p. 31
41. Nwosu v. Udeaja & Ors (1990) 1 NWLR (pt.125) pg.188 – cited at pp. 5, 47
42. Obayagbona v. Obazee (1972) 2 NSCC 383 – cited at p. 16
43. Obimomire v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All NLR 250 – cited at pp. 20, 43, 52
44. Oduko v. Government of Ebonyi State (2009) 9 NWLR (pt.1147) pg.439 – cited at pp. 4, 37, 47
45. Ogojefor v. Ogojefor (2006) 3 NWLR (pt.966) pg.12 – cited at p. 8
46. Ogunsola v. NICON (1996) 1 NWLR (pt.423) pg.126 – cited at p. 19
47. Ogunremi v. Dada (1962) 2 SCNLR 417 – cited at p. 23
48. Ojiako & Ors v. Ogueze (1962) 1 SCNLR 112 – cited at pp. 5, 20, 43
49. Ojo v. Abogunrin (1989) 5 NWLR (pt.120) pg.162 – cited at p. 26
50. Okafor v. Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (pt.64) pg.129 – cited at p. 18
51. Okafor & Ors v. A-G Anambra State & Ors (1991) 6 NWLR (pt.200) pg.659 – cited at pp. 5, 20, 37, 43, 47, 52
52. Okonkwo v. Ngige (2007) 12 NWLR (pt.1047) pg.191 – cited at pp. 5, 48
53. Olufunmise v. Fatana (1990) 3 NWLR (pt.136) pg.1 – cited at pp. 20, 43, 52
54. Olurotimi v. Ige (1993) 8 NWLR (pt.311) pg.257 – cited at p. 19
55. Onuaguluchi v. Ndu (2001) 7 NWLR (pt.712) pg.309 – cited at pp. 5, 48
56. Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) SCNLR 244 – cited at pp. 27, 34
57. Osho v. Foreign Finance Corporation (1991) 4 NWLR (pt.184) pg.157 – cited at p. 31
58. Our Line Ltd. v. SCC (Nig.) Ltd. (2009) 17 NWLR (pt.1170) pg.382 – cited at pp. 4, 22, 47
59. Owum v. INEC (1999) 10 NWLR (pt.622) pg.192 – cited at p. 27
60. Oyeyipo v. Oyintoye (1982) 1 NWLR (pt.50) pg.356 – cited at pp. 19, 51
61. Paul Cardoso v. John Bankole Daniel & Ors (1986) 2 NWLR 1 – cited at p. 41
62. Peters v. David (1999) 5 NWLR (pt.603) pg.486 – cited at p. 29
63. Rossek v. ACB Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (pt.312) pg.382 – cited at p. 18
64. S.B.N. v. Okon (2004) 9 NWLR (pt.879) pg.529 – cited at p. 23
65. Saliyun v. Mastu (1975) 1 NMLR pg.55 – cited at p. 5
66. Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd. v. Secondy Ukey (1981) SC 6 – cited at pp. 4, 20, 22, 37, 43, 47, 52
67. Stirling Civil Eng. (Nig) Ltd v. Yahaya (2005) 11 NWLR (pt.935) pg.181 – cited at p. 19
68. UBA Plc v. Ekpo (2003) 12 NWLR (pt.834) pg.322 – cited at p. 17
69. Ugwa & Anor v. Lekwauwa & Ors (unreported) delivered 3rd December 2010 – cited at pp. 2, 5, 9, 46, 48
70. Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (pt.1048) pg.367 – cited at p. 27
71. Ukachukwu v. Uba (2005) 18 NWLR (pt.956) pg.1 – cited at p. 21
72. Umanah v. Attah (2006) 17 NWLR (pt.1009) 503 – cited at pp. 5, 48
73. Umenweluaka v. Ezeana (1972) 5 SC 343 – cited at pp. 4, 22
74. Umuana v. Okwurame (1979) 11 NSCC 319 – cited at p. 19
75. University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 NWLR (pt.1) pg.156 – cited at p. 31
76. Vaswani Trading Co. v. Savalakh & Co. (1972) All NLR (pt.2) pg.483 – cited at p. 17
Referenced Statutes
1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 – Sections 6(5), 6(6), 6(6)(a), 14(1), 14(2), 14(2)(a), 14(2)(c), 145(1)(a), 177, 182, 233, 233(1), 235, 246(1), 246(1)(b)(i)-(ii), 246(3), 285(2), 287(1), 287(3) – cited at pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 17, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47
2. Electoral Act, 2006 – Sections 32(4), 34(1), 34(2), 38, 145(1)(a) – cited at pp. 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34
3. Supreme Court Act – Section 22 – cited at pp. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 21, 22, 36, 37, 38, 45, 46